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 Regulation of Sports Agents and College Football: 
Perception or Reality? 
Noam Silverman 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Under the current system in which football players transition 
from amateur athletes to professionals in the National Football 
League (“NFL”), the only available means for a player to showcase 
his talent is through participation in collegiate athletics.1  Additional-
ly, even if an extremely talented high school player wanted to try his 
luck in the NFL without college experience, he would be forced to 
wait three years after graduation before being eligible to play in the 
NFL.2  While the NFL does not require any player to participate in 
collegiate athletics in order to play in the NFL, the three year waiting 
period, coupled with the fact that initial entry in the league is through 
the “College Draft,” indicates that the only real means for a player to 
have access to playing in the NFL is by first showcasing his skills in 
college.3 
With collegiate football being the only means for a player aspir-
ing to play in the NFL to showcase his skills, a player’s eligibility to 
participate in college football is of the utmost importance.  The Na-
tional Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) governs college 
football, as well as all collegiate athletics.4  The NCAA regulates ath-
letic competitions amongst 1070 schools that span three divisions of 
college athletics.5  One of the primary purposes of the NCAA is “to 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Under the NFL collective bargaining agreement, signed in 2011, there is no form of 
sanctioned minor league professional football where players showcase themselves for the major 
professional clubs.  See NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT (Aug. 4, 2011) [hereinaf-
ter NFL CBA], available at http://nfllabor.files.wordpress.com/2010/01/collective-bargaining-
agreement-2011-2020.pdf.  
 2 See id. at 17 (requiring an individual to wait three years after the year they graduate or 
should have graduated high school in order to be eligible to play in the NFL). 
 3 See id. at 17. 
 4 2010-2011 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL 1 [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL] (2010), availa-
ble at  http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D111.pdf. 
 5 Division I consists of schools who offer fourteen sports and includes 335 schools.  Divi-
sion II has 288 schools that must offer at least ten sports.  Division III schools make up the re-
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encourage its members to adopt eligibility rules to comply with satis-
factory standards of scholarship, sportsmanship and amateurism.”6  As 
such, it is a requirement that all student-athletes participating in the 
NCAA must maintain amateur status.7  The primary requirement for 
an athlete maintaining his or her amateur status under the require-
ments of the NCAA is refraining from accepting any type of monetary 
compensation for competing in collegiate athletics.8   
While the majority of the NCAA sports and NCAA athletes have 
no issue with adhering to the amateurism requirement, the 2010 
NCAA football season has been marred with numerous accounts of 
players receiving money for playing college football.9  The vast major-
ity of these stories have come from sports agents enticing college ath-
letes to use their representation for negotiations with professional 
teams in exchange for money or other benefits while the players are in 
college.10  Agents paying college athletes is not just a violation of 
NCAA rules, but also a violation of federal law,11 a majority of state 
laws,12 and a violation of the National Football League Players Asso-
ciation (“NFLPA”) Regulations Governing Contract Advisors 
                                                                                                                           
mainder and are eligible for the NCAA with only one sport.  Differences Among the Three 
Divisions, NCAA.ORG, 
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/about+the+ncaa/who+ 
we+are/differences+among+the+divisions/division+I (last visited Mar. 7, 2010). 
 6 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 4, at 1. 
 7 Id. at 65. 
 8 See id. at 61-76. 
 9 Former football sports agent Josh Luchs revealed to Sports Illustrated in October of 
2010 that he personally paid more than thirty college football players and that this type of activi-
ty was the norm amongst agents looking to achieve success in representing college athletes as 
they become professionals.  George Dohrmann, Confessions of an Agent, SPORTS 
ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 18, 2010), available at 
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/ 
MAG1175725/index.htm (former agent Josh Luchs was the primary source for the article). 
 10 See Agent Scandal Costs UNC Three Players, ESPN.COM (Oct. 11, 2010), 
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=5673405; Ivan Maisel & Mark Schlabach, Dareus 
May Have Attended Agent’s Party, ESPN.COM (July 22, 2010), 
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=5396236; NCAA Seeks Insight on Rogue Agents, 
ESPN.COM (Oct. 27, 2010), http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=5735310; Alan Scher 
Zagier, Agent Oversight Continues to Vex College Sports (Sept. 2, 2010), 
http://www.gazettextra.com/news/2010/sep/02/agent-oversight-continues-vex-college-sports/. 
 11 Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act (SPARTA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 7801-07 (2006). 
 12 Uniform Athlete Agents Act (UAAA) drafted by the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws and Approved and Recommended for Enactment in all the 
States.  FAQ on Uniform Athlete Agents Act, NCAA.ORG (July 29, 2010), http://www. 
ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Resources/Latest+News/2010+news+stories/July+lates
t+news/FAQ+on+Uniform+Athlete+Agents+Act.  As of July 2010, the UAAA has been adopt-
ed by forty states and the District of Columbia.  Id.  Additionally, California, Michigan, and 
Ohio have adopted non-UAAA legislation for regulating agents.  Id. 
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(“RGCA”).13  Given the fact that agents can be regulated through 
federal and state law, as well as through the NFLPA, one would think 
that players receiving payments from agents would not be any issue 
for the NCAA.  However, given what has been reported in 2010 
alone, it is clear that agents are still paying players in order to obtain 
the players’ commitment to allow the agent to represent the player. 
This Comment will discuss the various regulations that are cur-
rently in place to curb the issue of athlete agents paying college foot-
ball players and offer some suggestions for how to improve the cur-
rent system in order for the NCAA to maintain its goal of promoting 
amateur athletics.  Section II will focus on the background of the 
NCAA, including the importance of maintaining true amateur colle-
giate athletics.  Additionally, this section will cover the background of 
the Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act (“SPARTA”),14 the 
Uniform Athlete Agents Act (“UAAA”),15 and the NFLPA RGCA.16  
This section will also cover the public policy, which ultimately led to 
the enactment of federal and state laws governing athlete agents.   
Section III will provide analysis for why, even with all the regula-
tion in place, there are still major issues with maintaining true ama-
teur athletics for the NCAA.  This section will deal with the limited 
power the NCAA has in preventing unethical agents from tampering 
with collegiate athletes.  Additionally, the reasons why the NCAA 
must maintain a positive public image if it hopes to remain a true am-
ateur league will be explained.  The pros and cons of the state and 
federal legislation will also be discussed.  Lastly, this section will ex-
plain why the NFLPA has the greatest power to regulate agents but 
also the least incentive to enforce its power.   
Finally, Section IV will provide several potential means by which 
those with the power to curb the issue could act to prevent players 
and agents from tampering with the true amateur nature of the 
NCAA.  This will include the media’s role in shaping public percep-
tion of the NCAA, as well as the perception of the issues, the poten-
tial impact a minor league football league could have, and how the 
NFLPA choosing to hire its own in-house agents could solve the is-
sues with agents paying collegiate athletes. 
                                                                                                                           
 13 Any certified NFLPA agent is prohibited from offering anything of value to a potential 
client or his family to encourage that person to use the agent’s services.  NFLPA REGULATIONS 
GOVERNING CONTRACT ADVISORS 8 (2007) [hereinafter NFLPA RGCA], available at 
http://images.nflplayers.com/mediaResources/files/PDFs/SCAA/NFLPA_Regulations_Contract
_Advisors.pdf. 
 14 15 U.S.C. §§ 7801-07 (2006). 
 15 Uniform Athlete Agents Act (2000) [hereinafter UAAA], available at http://www.law. 
upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/uaaa/aaa1130.htm. 
 16 NFLPA RGCA supra note 13. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
The NCAA, federal government, state government, and NFLPA 
all have an interest in ensuring collegiate athletes are not receiving 
improper benefits from agents.  One of the NCAA’s primary goals is 
to promote intercollegiate amateur athletics.17  The federal govern-
ment and most state legislatures have enacted laws in order to deter 
agents from soliciting collegiate athletes with improper benefits.18  
Lastly, because a violation of federal or state law would call into ques-
tion the integrity of a sanctioned agent, the NFLPA also has an inter-
est in ensuring collegiate athletes are not receiving benefits from 
agents.19  The following sub-sections explain the background of the 
NCAA, federal and state legislation, and the NFLPA in order to show 
what each entity has done to ensure that collegiate athletes maintain 
amateur status.  
A. NCAA 
Originally named the Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the 
United States (“IAAUS”), what has become today’s NCAA was 
founded in 190620 as a means to regulate college football, which had 
become an extremely dangerous sport.21  While the NCAA has ex-
panded to cover all collegiate athletics, its purpose of protecting play-
ers and improving intercollegiate athletics remains the same.22  Aside 
from regulating the athletic competition itself, the NCAA also serves 
as the regulatory body for school institutional control over athletic 
programs, ethical conduct, athletic personnel, amateurism, recruiting, 
eligibility requirements, and financial aid.23 
With the growing popularity of college football, the enforcement 
of NCAA rules has become more difficult than when its only purpose 
                                                                                                                           
 17 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 4, at 1. 
 18 See Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act (SPARTA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 7801-07 
(2006); Latest News, supra note 12.  
 19 See NFLPA RGCA, supra note 13, at 8-11. 
 20 The name was changed to the NCAA in 1910.  History, NCAA.ORG, http:// 
www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/about+the+ncaa/who+we+are/about+the+ncaa+his
tory (last updated Nov. 8, 2010). 
 21 The lack of standardized rules and regulations in college football led to numerous inju-
ries and even deaths which prompted several schools to eliminate their football programs and 
created the need for a regulatory body.  Id. 
 22 See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 4, at 1. 
 23 See generally NCAA MANUAL, supra note 4.  The current Division I manual contains 
431 pages of rules and regulations intended to maintain the integrity of the NCAA as an organi-
zation whose primary goal is the maintenance of an amateur collegiate sports program.  Id. 
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was maintaining player safety.24  The popularity of NCAA sports has 
led to large television deals and has made the NCAA an extremely 
large organization.25  Given the high revenue reported, there are many 
who feel college athletes should be paid, including many athletes 
themselves.26  With players feeling entitled to payment, it leaves the 
door open for unethical agents to take advantage of the situation and 
offer to pay the players while they are in college in exchange for the 
agents having the opportunity to later profit from the players by rep-
resenting them in contract negotiations.27 
As part of its effort to maintain the integrity of college sports, the 
NCAA rules state that any athlete that uses or receives any benefit 
from an agent is no longer eligible to compete in NCAA sanctioned 
events.28  Additionally, any school that knowingly allows an illegible 
student to compete, or is an unknowing multiple offender, has com-
mitted a major violation under NCAA rules.29  The presumptive pen-
alties imposed on an institution guilty of a major violation are ex-
tremely severe and include a two-year probationary period, a reduc-
tion in recruiting visits for one year, a requirement that coaches are 
not allowed to engage in off-campus recruiting for one year, a reduc-
tion in financial aid awards, post-season sanctions, and a requirement 
that the institution recertify that it is in compliance with all NCAA 
rules.30 
While the NCAA, as shown through the harsh penalties, takes 
the integrity of its competition extremely seriously, NCAA rules only 
address the issue of collegiate athletes who accept improper benefits 
                                                                                                                           
 24 A 2009 Harris poll showed college football as the third most popular sport, and most 
popular college sport, trailing only professional football and baseball respectively.  Football 
Expands Lead Over Baseball as America’s Favorite Sport, HARRISINTERACTIVE.com (Feb. 1, 
2010), http://www.harrisinteractive.com/vault/Harris-Interactive-Poll-Research-Sports-Popularity- 
2010-02.pdf.  
 25 The NCAA generated roughly $722 million in total revenue from the 2009-2010 athletic 
seasons.  See Where Does the Money Go?, NCAA.ORG, http://ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/ 
public/ncaa/answers/nine+points+to+consider_one (last visited Mar. 7, 2011).  The NCAA dis-
tributes sixty percent of its revenue back to its member institutions.  Id.  
 26 See Kelly Whiteside, College Athletes Want Cut of Action, USATODAY.COM (Aug. 31, 
2009), http://www.usatoday.com/sports/2004-08-31-top-ten-number-7_x.htm.  
 27 See Dohrmann, supra note 9.  The compensation for an agent can be quite lucrative as it 
can reach three percent of the total value of the players’ salaries.  NFLPA RGCA, supra note 
13, at 12.  Put in perspective, the agent who advised Donovan McNabb’s contract extension 
worth $70 million would receive $210,000 on this one contract alone.  See Adam Schefter, ’11 
Bonus Key in Donovan McNabb Deal, ESPN.COM (Nov. 18, 2010), http://sports.espn.go.com/ 
nfl/news/story?id=5812371.  
 28 NCAA Manual, supra note 4, at 73. 
 29 Id. at 319-20. 
 30 Id. at 322-23. 
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and not the agent who has provided the benefits.31  The NCAA has no 
regulatory power over the agents since the NCAA can only penalize 
its members, and agents are not members of the NCAA.32  Additional-
ly, there is nothing in the NCAA rules that prohibits an athlete from 
speaking with or receiving advice from agents.33   
The NCAA requirements are that the amateur athletes refrain 
from entering into contracts with agents or receiving any benefits 
from agents.34  A collegiate athlete becomes ineligible under NCAA 
rules by entering into any contract, either oral or written, with an 
agent.35  An athlete also loses his eligibility for agreeing to allow an 
agent to represent him once his college career has ended.36  Lastly, a 
collegiate athlete cannot receive benefits of any kind from an agent, 
regardless of whether the agent has any intent of representing the ath-
lete.37  The term “benefits” has been interpreted broadly by the 
NCAA.  It has included things as minor as taking a ride to class on a 
golf cart,38 as well as the more obvious financial gifts.39 
The players have little to fear from the NCAA because by the 
time they get caught, if they are caught at all, they will have likely al-
ready left college and moved on to the NFL or another career.40  
NCAA investigations of rules violations are often not completed until 
years after the violation occurred.  Arizona State University was not 
penalized until five years after their infractions began,41 the NCAA 
took two years before they announced a penalty for rule violations at 
                                                                                                                           
 31 See id. at 73-74. 
 32 See id. at 7-8. 
 33 Id. at 73. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 University of Southern California freshman running back Dillon Baxter was ruled ineli-
gible for NCAA competition after he accepted a ride on a golf cart on USC’s campus from an 
NFLPA agent.  Pedro Moura, USC Wants Dillon Baxter Reinstated, ESPNLOSANGELES.COM, 
http://sports.espn.go.com/los-angeles/ncf/news/story?id=5827657 (last updated Nov. 22, 2010).  
The ride was considered an extra benefit.  Id.   
 39 University of North Carolina football players Marvin Austin, Robert Quinn, and Greg 
Little lost their NCAA eligibility for accepting jewelry and airfare from an agent.  Agent Scan-
dal Costs UNC Three Players, ESPN.COM, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=5673405 
(last updated Oct. 11, 2010). 
 40 The Dillon Baxter and UNC scandals may represent a trend that the NCAA will have 
quicker investigations, and players may be more likely to suffer some penalty for accepting 
improper benefits. 
 41 Division I Committee on Infraction Issues Decision on Arizona State University, 
NCAA.ORG (Dec. 15, 2010), http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/PressArchive/2010/20101215+asu+coi+ 
rls.htm. 
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the University of Michigan,42 and six years after initially violating 
NCAA rules, the University of Southern California was finally disci-
plined for its rules violations.43  This means that by the time the 
NCAA comes out with a ruling, the player is most likely well beyond 
his college career.  This leaves the colleges to face the brunt of the 
punishment as the NCAA charges each member institution with the 
responsibility of ensuring that it is in compliance with NCAA rules.44 
B. SPARTA 
The Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act (SPARTA) is the 
federal government’s response to the issue of unethical agents paying 
college athletes.45  SPARTA begins by broadly defining who classifies 
as an “athlete agent” and “student-athlete,” as well as providing 
broad definitions for the types of contracts covered including agency, 
endorsement, and professional sports contracts.46  SPARTA makes it 
illegal for any athlete agent to solicit or recruit a student-athlete into 
entering an agency contract by using misleading or false representa-
tions, or by providing the student-athlete with anything of value.47  
Additionally, the act requires that any time an agent enters into an 
agency contract with a student, the agent provides the student with a 
disclosure document.48  The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) en-
forces SPARTA, and any violation of SPARTA is considered an un-
fair or deceptive practice under section 18(a)(1)(B) of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act.49 
In addition to the FTC having the authority to enforce SPARTA, 
the attorney general of any state that has reason to believe that the act 
is being violated can bring a civil action on behalf of the residents of 
the state to enjoin the agent, enforce compliance with SPARTA, or 
                                                                                                                           
 42 Division I Committee on Infractions Issues Decision on University of Michigan, 
NCAA.ORG (Nov. 4, 2010), http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/PressArchive/2010/20101104+d1+coi+ 
univ+of+mich.htm. 
 43 Division I Committee on Infractions Issues Decision on University of Southern Califor-
nia, NCAA.ORG (June 10, 2010), http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/PressArchive/2010/20100610+d1+ 
coi+usc.htm. 
 44 See NCAA Manual, supra note 4, at 3. 
 45 15 U.S.C. §§ 7801-07 (2006). 
 46 Id. at § 7801.  SPARTA essentially considers an agent any person who recruits or solicits 
a student-athlete to enter into a professional sports or endorsement contract other than the 
athlete’s family. 
 47 Id. at § 7802(a)(1)(A)-(B). 
 48 Id. at § 7802(b).  The disclosure statement must state that the athlete knows that he or 
she is forfeiting future eligibility by signing the contract and that either the student or the agent 
must notify the school that the student has signed and is no longer eligible.  Id. § 7802(b)(3). 
 49 Id. at § 7803. 
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obtain restitution for any damages caused to the state.50  The states 
also have the authority to conduct their own investigations for viola-
tions of SPARTA and compel witnesses to appear or produce docu-
mentary evidence.51  The FTC, however, maintains the right to inter-
vene in any action brought by an attorney general.52 
SPARTA also gives any college affected by a violation of the act 
a civil right of action.53  If a college receives any form of discipline 
from the NCAA, or gives itself any self-imposed sanctions to comply 
with NCAA rules, the college has the right to recover any expenses 
incurred or ascertainable damages as a result of the discipline re-
ceived due to the action of the agent.54  A lack of determinative case 
law or clarification in the statute leaves a grey area for what exactly 
these damages might be.  For example, one potential punishment a 
college may receive is a loss of scholarships.55  However, the damages 
suffered from this punishment would only affect athletic performance 
in making a determination of any financial damages difficult.  Even 
the financial loss a school may suffer from a penalty of not being able 
to participate in postseason events56 are speculative because no team 
is guaranteed to qualify for postseason play.  Absent any additional 
legislation or guidance from courts, it is still unclear as to what poten-
tial damages a school can recover.57 
Lastly, Congress, in its SPARTA legislation, encouraged the 
states to adopt their own sport agent regulations.58  Congress felt that 
each state should have its own scheme for regulating agents in order 
to protect the student-athletes and to protect the integrity of amateur 
athletics.59  Particularly, Congress felt that the states should require 
agents to register with the state and provide protections to the stu-
dent-athletes in the process of signing with an agent.60  As part of their 
                                                                                                                           
 50 Id. at § 7804(a)(1). 
 51 Id. at § 7804(c). 
 52 Id. at § 7804(b)(1). 
 53 Id. at § 7805(b)(1). 
 54 Id. at § 7805(b)(2). 
 55 See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 4, at 322-23. 
 56 See id. 
 57 SPARTA also gives private citizens a right of action for damages caused by an agent.  15 
U.S.C. § 7806.  Presumably, the only private individual who could bring a claim would be an 
athlete that lost eligibility as a result of the agent’s deceptive practice.  In this instance too, there 
would be a question as to what damages the athlete could recover since they cannot receive 
compensation in college.  It would be difficult to determine the actual damages suffered from 
losing eligibility. 
 58 Id. at § 7807. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id.  These protections include the right for the student-athlete to cancel the agency 
contract and require the agent to make disclosures to the student-athlete.  
2011] Regulation of Sports Agents and College Football 195 
recommendations to the states, Congress also felt that the states 
should enact the Uniform Athlete Agents Act.61 
C. UAAA     
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws drafted the Uniform Athlete Agents Act (“UAAA”).62  At the 
time the UAAA was released, twenty-eight states had some form of 
legislation regulating athlete agents with all of them having a great 
deal of variance from each other.63  The differences in the registration 
requirements and the lack of reciprocity amongst the states made it 
extremely difficult for agents to operate in multiple states and remain 
compliant with the varying laws.64  As a result, the NCAA, along with 
several universities, requested the Conference to draft a uniform set 
of laws for the states.65  With the help of representatives from the 
NFLPA, as well as representatives from the players associations of the 
National Hockey League and Major League Baseball,66 the Confer-
ence drafted the UAAA, which has since been adopted by forty 
states.67 
The first major component of the UAAA is its strict registration 
requirement.  Under the UAAA, before any individual may initiate 
contact with a student-athlete for the purpose of entering into an 
agency contract, that person must register with the state.68  Even if the 
individual is approached by the student-athlete, rather than selling his 
services, that individual would have seven days to apply for athlete-
agent registration in order to continue the relationship.69  Any con-
tract entered into with an agent who is not properly certified is auto-
matically voided under the UAAA.70 
The registration requirement is the greatest distinction between 
the UAAA and the federal laws of SPARTA.  As part of the registra-
tion process, the agent requesting certification must make a number 
                                                                                                                           
 61 Id. 
 62 UAAA, supra note 15. 
 63 See id. at 1. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. at 1-2. 
 67 FAQ on Uniform Athlete Agents Act, supra note 12. 
 68 UAAA, supra note 15, at 7. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id.  The comment indicates that the purpose of this section of the UAAA is to make an 
extremely broad registration requirement in order to satisfy the minimum contacts requirements 
of Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).  By requiring registration in any state 
where the agent contacts a student-athlete, the agent would have established minimum contacts 
in those states. 
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of disclosures.71  These disclosures include the name and location of 
the agent’s businesses, the agent’s formal training and practical expe-
rience, a list of character references, any partners in the agent’s ven-
ture, whether the agent or any of his associates have ever been con-
victed of a crime, and whether the agent or any of his associates have 
ever been sanctioned for any professional misconduct.72  After making 
these disclosures, the attorney general of the state then has the power 
to determine whether the agent has the “fitness to act as an athlete 
agent.”73  When determining the fitness of the agent, the secretary of 
state may consider any relevant information disclosed in the applica-
tion form as well as how recent any harmful conduct occurred and the 
nature and context of any potentially harmful conduct.74  Once an 
agent is approved, he must renew the application every two years and 
even when re-approved, the secretary of state maintains the right to 
suspend or revoke the registration.75 
The UAAA contains the same warning to the student-athlete as 
SPARTA, but the UAAA also adds several requirements for the 
agency contract not required in SPARTA.76  The UAAA requires the 
contract to contain the method for compensation of the agent as well 
as any other individual that may be compensated as a result of the 
student-athlete signing the agency contract.77  The contract also must 
specify any costs the student-athlete would need to reimburse the 
agent for, the description of the services of the agent, and the duration 
and date of execution.78  The failure of the contract to include any of 
these requirements would make the contract voidable.79  These provi-
sions are designed to protect the student-athlete in the process of sign-
ing with an agent.80  As an additional protection offered by the 
UAAA, any student-athlete has the right to cancel any agency within 
                                                                                                                           
 71 See UAAA, supra note 15,  at 8-10. 
 72 See id. 
 73 Id. at 11. 
 74 See id. at 11-12. 
 75 Id. at 13-14.  Additionally, each state may include registration fees for initial applica-
tions, applications based on registration in another state, renewals, and renewals based on regis-
tration in another state.  Id. at 15. 
 76 Compare id. at 17, with 15 U.S.C. § 7802(b)(3) (2006). 
 77 UAAA, supra note 15, at 16. 
 78 Id. at 16-17. 
 79 Id. 
 80 See id. at 17.  For simplicity in drafting, the reference to student-athletes applies to both 
current and former student-athletes.  See id. 
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fourteen days of signing the contract.81  A student-athlete cannot 
waive this right.82 
Following the registration and contractual formalities, the 
UAAA deals with the prohibited conduct for athlete agents.83  The 
prohibited conduct is similar to that of SPARTA.84  The prohibited 
conduct forbids an agent from giving any false or misleading infor-
mation to the student-athlete for the purpose of obtaining an agency 
contract, giving the athlete anything of value prior to entering into an 
agency contract, intentionally contacting a student-athlete without 
registering with the state, and falsifying any disclosures in the registra-
tion form.85  Any violation of the prohibitions of the act leaves the 
agent subject to criminal sanctions by the state in which the violation 
occurred as well as a fine of up to $25,000.86 
Additionally, any violation of the act leaves the agent subject to 
civil suits.87  The UAAA gives colleges and universities a right of ac-
tion against both the agent and the student-athlete for any damages 
caused as a result of a violation of the act.88  While the schools have 
the right to sue both the agent and the student-athlete, the liability of 
either under the act is several and not joint.89  The educational institu-
tions have the right to recover damages incurred as a result of any 
penalty or suspension from competition by the NCAA or any other 
conference affiliation or damages from any self-imposed penalty in 
order to mitigate any potential sanctions.90 
                                                                                                                           
 81 Id. at 19. 
 82 Id.  The comment indicates that this section of the UAAA addresses the disparity in 
sophistication between the student-athlete and the agent, and that the athlete may still cancel 
the contract even if the agent has completely complied with all of the requirements under the 
UAAA. 
 83 See id. at 20. 
 84 Compare id. at 20-21, with 15 U.S.C. § 7802 (2006). 
 85 UAAA, supra note 15, at 20-21. 
 86 Id. at 21-23.  The UAAA leaves the determination of the severity of the criminal sanc-
tion up to the state. 
 87 See id. at 22. 
 88 Id.  This is a major distinction from the federal law under SPARTA as the UAAA 
allows the school to sue the student-athlete as well as the agent. 
 89 Id. at 22-23.  The comment to section 16 realizes that it will be unlikely for a university 
to sue its former student athlete due to the negative impact it may have on future recruiting.  Id.  
However, the option is still available for especially egregious cases.  Id.  Additionally, section 16 
does not limit the student-athlete from bringing his own suit against the agent for any damages 
the agent may be liable for under existing law.  Id. 
 90 Id. at 22.  The school’s right of action does not accrue until the school discovers or with 
reasonable diligence would have discovered the violation of the UAAA. 
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D. National Football League Players Association Regulations for 
Contract Advisors 
While SPARTA and the UAAA have some deterrent and regis-
tration requirements that agents must follow in order to avoid crimi-
nal or civil penalties, the real power of regulating athlete agents who 
represent NFL athletes lies in the NFLPA.  Under the current NFL 
collective bargaining agreement, the NFLPA is recognized as the 
“[s]ole and exclusive bargaining representative of present and future 
employee players in the NFL . . . .”91  As the exclusive bargaining rep-
resentative of the players, the National Labor Relations Act gives the 
NFLPA the exclusive right to represent NFL players in negotiations 
over wages, working hours, or any other employment matters.92  As 
the exclusive representative of the players, the NFL CBA recognizes 
that under federal labor law the NFLPA has the sole authority to reg-
ulate the agents that represent any players in contract negotiations 
with NFL teams.93 
Under the current NFLPA Regulations Governing Contract Ad-
visors (“RGCA”), no individual may, on behalf of a player, negotiate 
with or advise an NFL team in regards to the terms of a player’s con-
tract, unless that person is certified by the NFLPA, has a signed rep-
resentation agreement with the player, and has filed that agreement 
with the NFLPA.94  This includes anyone who gives counsel to a play-
er with respect to negotiating contracts with the individual clubs, en-
forcing those contracts once signed, and anyone who provides counsel 
on tax or investment services related to the negotiation of the con-
tract.95  These rules are not set for any length of time, as the NFLPA 
Board of Player Representatives and officers of the NFLPA have the 
discretion to change these rules at any time.96 
                                                                                                                           
 91 See NFL CBA, supra note 1, at xiv. 
 92 See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006). 
 93 NFL CBA, supra note 1, at 210.  The NFL may only use agents certified by the NFLPA 
for contract negotiations with NFL teams.  Id. 
 94 NFLPA RGCA, supra note 13, at 3. 
 95 Id.  This section relates only to financial issues that deal directly with the contract as 
there is a separate certification needed to become a financial advisor for an NFL Player.  See 
generally, NFL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION REGULATIONS AND CODE OF CONDUCT GOVERNING 
REGISTERED PLAYER FINANCIAL ADVISORS (2007), available at http://images.nflplayers.com/ 
mediaResources/images/oldImages/fck/NFLPAregs(3).pdf.  
 96 See NFLPA RGCA, supra note 13, at 18.  The Board of Player Representatives consists 
of a representative from each NFL team and the officers consist of a president and ten vice 
presidents elected from the Board as well as an executive director elected by the Board.  See 
NFL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION CONSTITUTION 9-12 (2007), available at http://images.nflplayers. 
com/mediaResources/images/oldImages/fck/NFLPA%20Constitution%20-%20March%202007.pdf. 
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In order to become an NFLPA certified contract advisor, an in-
dividual must pay a required application fee,97 attend the NFLPA 
seminar for new agents, pass a written test, and file the required ap-
plication form.98  The only other requirement for an agent is an under-
graduate degree from an accredited four-year school and a post-
graduate degree from an accredited school.  However, this require-
ment can be waived and there are no requirements for what field the 
degrees must be in.99  Applications to the NFLPA will be denied if an 
applicant made any false statements in the application, had any histo-
ry of misappropriating funds rendering the applicant unfit to serve as 
a fiduciary, had been denied by another professional sports associa-
tion, and if the applicant had solicited a player for representation pri-
or to being certified.100 
Aside from the general requirements of attending training and 
acting in a trustworthy manner, the only requirement relevant to 
agent contact with student-athletes is the requirement that all agents 
comply with applicable state and federal laws.101  Although the prohib-
ited conduct does not specifically mention student-athletes, there are 
prohibitions which effectively cover agents who have contact with 
students that would violate NCAA rules.102  The rules specifically pro-
hibit any agent from offering anything of value to any prospective 
client or his family in order to encourage the person to become a cli-
ent regardless of whether the prospective client is a student-athlete or 
an NFL veteran.103  Additionally, agents are not permitted to have any 
contact with any player who is not eligible for the NFL draft.104 
Clearly an agent who was found to have violated SPARTA or 
UAAA would be in violation of the NFLPA RGCA, and the NFLPA 
                                                                                                                           
 97 The fee for 2012 was $2,500.  Agent Regulations, NFLPA, http://www.nflplayers.com/ 
about-us/Rules--Regulations/Agent-Regulations/ (last visited Apr. 29, 2012). 
 98 NFLPA RGCA, supra note 13, at 3-4. 
 99 Id.  This requirement seems to be easily waived in light of the NFLPA certifying Teague 
Egan as a contract advisor while Egan was still an undergraduate at the University of Southern 
California.  See Pedro Moura, USC: Student/Agent Warned, ESPNLOSANGELES.COM, 
http://sports.espn.go.com/los-angeles/ncf/news/story?id=5836913(last updated Nov. 22, 2010). 
 100 NFLPA RGCA, supra note 13, at 4. 
 101 Id. at 6-8.  With the enactment of SPARTA, and with a majority of states enacting the 
UAAA, section 3 becomes applicable to agents who tamper with a student-athletes eligibility. 
 102 See id. at 8, 11. 
 103 Id. at 8. 
 104 Id. at 11.  This section also does not mention student-athletes or any NCAA regulations.  
See id.  However, under the NFL CBA, a player is not eligible for the NFL draft until three NFL 
regular seasons have been completed after the player has finished high school so this section 
would apply to students up until their junior year at a university.  See NFL CBA, supra note 1, at  
17. 
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could then suspend or permanently revoke the agent’s certification.105  
However, absent a criminal conviction or civil suit, the only manner in 
which the NFLPA adjudicates violations of the RGCA is through ar-
bitration of disputes brought by either players or other agents.106  Ad-
ditionally, the president of the NFLPA appoints a committee of three 
to five active or retired NFL players to serve on the Committee on 
Agent Regulation and Discipline (“CARD”).107  CARD, with the as-
sistance of the general counsel of the NFLPA, serves to prosecute 
agents who violate the RGCA.108  CARD may file complaints against 
an agent for violations of the RGCA to which the agent has the right 
to answer.  However, CARD retains the ultimate power to determine 
whether the agent’s answer sufficiently rebuts the allegations and 
whether or not discipline will be imposed on the agent.109  But CARD 
is not the final authority on the agent’s discipline as the agent may 
appeal to outside arbitrator.  It should be noted that the arbitrator is 
selected by the NFLPA.110 
III.   ANALYSIS 
With NCAA rules in place to maintain amateur collegiate athlet-
ics, SPARTA and the UAAA to protect the NCAA’s mission, and 
the NFLPA RGCA which, without actually mentioning that it per-
tains to college athletes, prohibits the type of activity that the NCAA 
is looking to combat, one would think that there should be no room 
for unscrupulous agents to operate.  Why then do some see it as the 
norm in college athletics for an agent to pay college athletes in order 
to obtain a commitment from the students to allow the agent to repre-
sent them?111  It starts with various agencies’ ability or zealousness in 
enforcing the standards.  If the agencies lack the ability, or fail to 
                                                                                                                           
 105 A violation of either the federal or state law would fall under the prohibited conduct of 
the RGCA.  See NFLPA RGCA, supra note 13, at 8-11.  The NFLPA has the authority to sus-
pend for a period of time or permanently revoke an agent’s license for performing any of the 
prohibited conduct in the RGCA.  Id. at 17. 
 106 See id. at 13.   
 107 Id. at 15. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. at 16-17. 
 110 See id. at 17-18.  The disciplinary process seems to put a seemingly insurmountable 
burden on the agent to prove his innocence once CARD chooses to file a complaint.  For a 
discussion on the relative fairness of agent regulation by professional sports unions, see Richard 
T. Karcher, Fundamental Fairness in Union Regulation of Sports Agents, 40 CONN. L. REV. 355 
(2007). 
 111 See Dohrmann supra note 9.  In Luchs’ recollection of life as an agent, he describes 
college player’s receiving payments from agents as the norm.  Id.  According to Luchs, only a 
few players ever rejected his offers to give the player some form of compensation.  Id. 
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zealously enforce their own standards, then clearly there is little that 
can be done to prevent unethical agent activity. 
A. NCAA 
The NCAA has been extremely vocal and active in its attempt to 
maintain its image as a true amateur athletic organization.112  Howev-
er, the NCAA is powerless when it comes to sanctioning agents.  Fur-
ther, by the time any wrongdoing is discovered, often times a player 
who has intentionally violated NCAA regulations has long since 
graduated or is close to entering the NFL,113 leaving only the school, 
which may have been entirely innocent in the matter, to suffer the 
consequences for violating NCAA rules.114  The NCAA realizes that it 
has limited power in this area and that in order for anything to change 
there needs to be more involvement from the NFL and the NFLPA.115  
Given the NCAA’s lack of power to directly regulate agents, a 
positive public perception of the NCAA as a legitimate organization 
is essential in order to obtain the help of legislators and the help of 
the NFLPA to protect the NCAA’s standards.  This was highlighted 
when investigators from North Carolina’s Secretary of State began an 
investigation of NFLPA certified agent Gary Wichard.116  North Caro-
lina’s investigation began as a result of a NCAA investigation involv-
ing Wichard and the University of North Carolina (UNC).117  Wichard 
made multiple transactions with former UNC assistant football coach 
                                                                                                                           
 112 See Q & A with NCAA Director of Agent, Gambling and Amateurism Activities Ra-
chel Newman Baker, NCAA.ORG (July 29, 2010), 
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Resources/Latest+News/2010+news+storie
s/July+latest+news/Interview+with+NCAA+Director+of+Agent,+Gambling+and+Amateurism
+Activities. 
 113 The highly publicized scandal involving University of Southern California football star 
Reggie Bush required a four-year investigation.  Madison Gray, USC Trojans Get Black Eye 
Over Reggie Bush Scandal, NEWSFEED.TIME.COM (June 10, 2010), http://newsfeed. 
time.com/2010/06/10/usc-trojans-get-black-eye-over-reggie-bush-scandal.  University of North 
Carolina football player Robert Quinn was ruled ineligible for the 2010-2011 football season for 
dealing with an agent.  UNC Kicks Austin Off Team; 2 Others Declared Ineligible, SI.COM (Oct. 
11, 2010), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2010/football/ncaa/10/11/unc.kicks.austin.off.team.ap/ 
index.html?xid=si _topstories.  However, it did not have a major impact on his ability to be 
drafted by an NFL team since some projected him as the seventh best player in the 2011 NFL 
Draft.  See Mel Kiper, Big Board Has a New No. 1, ESPN.COM, http://insider.espn. 
go.com/nfl/draft2011/insider/news/story?id=6174328 (last updated Mar. 2, 2011). 
 114 Even if a school had no knowledge they were allowing an ineligible player to partici-
pate, they are still in violation of NCAA rules.  See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 4, at 43. 
 115 See Q & A with NCAA Director of Agent, Gambling and Amateurism Activities Ra-
chel Newman Baker, supra note 112. 
 116 See Attorney: NC Investigators Interview Gary Wichard, USATODAY.COM, 
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/football/acc/2010-10-05-wichard-blake-nfl-
relationship_N.htm?csp=34sports (last updated Oct. 5, 2010). 
 117 Id. 
202 FIU Law Review [7:187 
John Blake.118  North Carolina’s investigation of the two deals primari-
ly with several benefits received by Marvin Austin, a UNC football 
player, while he was a student-athlete at UNC.119  Austin made several 
trips to Miami and California, including two trips to a football training 
facility two miles from Wichard’s agency.120  Austin’s name was listed 
on hotel receipts directly above Wichard’s agency name.121  The inves-
tigation believes that Wichard either funded the trips directly, or used 
Blake as a “runner” (person who acts on behalf of an agent) to pay 
for Austin’s trips.122  There are also reports that Blake recommended 
Wichard to former University of Alabama football player Marcell 
Dareus and former University of South Carolina football player Wes-
ley Saunders.123  Austin, Dareus, and Saunders were all sanctioned by 
either the NCAA or their respective universities for improper agent 
benefits.124  As of March 2, 2011, the investigation of Wichard was still 
ongoing.125  However, in December of 2010, the NFLPA suspended 
Wichard for nine months “for having impermissible communication” 
with a player in violation of the NFL CBA.126  
While the NCAA has shown that it is committed to maintaining 
its status as an organization that governs amateur collegiate athletics, 
the public’s perception of the NCAA does not always match the 
NCAA’s stated goals and objectives.127  The recent Cam Newton and 
                                                                                                                           
 118 Charles Robinson, Money Trail Ties Agent, Ex-UNC Coach, RIVALS.COM (Sept. 29, 
2010), http://rivals.yahoo.com/ ncaa/football/news?slug=cr-uncagents092910. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. 
 122 See id. 
 123 Charles Robinson & Dan Wetzel, Sources: Blake Recommended Agent to Dareus, 
RIVALS.COM (Oct. 3, 2010), http://rivals. yahoo.com/ncaa/football/news?slug=ys-dareus100310. 
 124 See id.; NCAA Requires Repayment, Loss of Contests for Marcell Dareus, NCAA.ORG 
(Sept. 2, 2010), http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Resources/Latest+News/ 
2010+news+stories/September+latest+news/NCAA+REQUIRES+REPAYMENT,+LOSS+OF
+CONTESTS+FOR+MARCELL+DAREUS; Agent Scandal Costs UNC Three Players, 
ESPN.COM, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=5673405 (last updated Oct. 11, 2010). 
 125 Investigators were given a search warrant for Wichard’s financial records in an attempt 
to prove Wichard had provided improper benefits to student-athletes in violation of North Caro-
lina law.  Agent’s Financial Records Sought, ESPN.COM, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/ 
story?id=6174078 (last updated Mar. 3, 2011). 
 126 Gary Wichard Suspended 9 Months, ESPN.COM, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/ 
story?id=5880708 (last updated Dec. 3, 2010). 
 127 See Gene Wojciechowski, The Cam Newton Affair Still Stinks, ESPN.COM (Jan. 21, 
2011), 
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/columns/story?columnist=wojciechowski_gene&page=wojcie 
chowski/110121&sportCat=ncf. 
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Ohio State University (“OSU”) scandals are two incidents in which 
the NCAA drew heavy criticism for its disciplinary action.128 
During the 2010-2011 football season, Cam Newton was accused 
of soliciting universities for cash payments in exchange for his agree-
ment to play at the university.129  The reports indicated that Newton 
had sought $180,000 from Mississippi State University (“MSU”) in 
exchange for an agreement to play football at the school.130  In De-
cember of 2009, Newton committed to play football at Auburn Uni-
versity (AU), a decision some believed was made by Newton’s father 
Cecil.131  There were never any allegations that AU paid Newton or 
his father for the commitment.132  The NCAA’s investigation revealed 
that Cecil Newton did in fact solicit MSU, but Cam never knew, or 
had anything to do, with the solicitation.133  Since Cam did not have 
any knowledge of his father’s actions, the NCAA ruled he was still 
eligible to compete.134 
The OSU scandal involved several football players who accepted 
improper benefits from a tattoo parlor and also sold some awards and 
championship rings they received from various team achievements.135  
The players all claimed that they did not know they were violating 
NCAA rules.136  In December of 2010, the NCAA ruled that five of 
the athletes would be suspended for the first five games of the 2011 
football season, and a sixth player would miss the first game of the 
2011 season.137  However, the players were not suspended for the Sug-
ar Bowl game, which was played after the NCAA ruling but before 
                                                                                                                           
 128 See Adam Ritenberg, NCAA, Sugar Bowl Defend OSU Decision, ESPN.COM (Dec. 29, 
2010), http://espn.go.com/blog/bigten/post/_/id/21560/ncaa-sugar-bowl-defend-osu-decision; 
Bruce Feldman, With Buckeyes, NCAA Just Keeps Spinning, ESPN.COM (Dec. 29, 2010), 
http://insider.espn.go.com/ncf/blog?name=feldman_bruce&id=5966094; Wojciechowski, supra 
note 127.  
 129 Pat Forde, Chris Low & Mark Schlabach, Cash Sought for Cam Newton, ESPN.COM, 
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=5765214 (last updated Nov. 5, 2010). 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. 
 133 NCAA Addresses Cam Newton’s Eligibility, NCAA.ORG (Dec. 1, 2010), 
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Resources/Latest+News/2010+news+storie
s/December/NCAA+addresses+eligibility+of+Cam+Newton. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Ohio State Football Players Sanctioned, ESPN.COM, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/ 
story?id=5950873 (last updated Dec. 26, 2010). 
 136 Pat Forde, NCAA Ruling Defies Common Sense, ESPN.COM (Dec. 23, 2010), 
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/columns/story?columnist=forde_pat&id=5951832. 
 137 NCAA Requires Loss of Contests for Six Ohio State Football Student Athletes, 
NCAA.ORG (Dec. 23, 2010), 
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/resources/latest+news/2010+news+stories/dec
ember/ncaa+requires+loss+of+contests+for+six+ohio+state+football+student-athletes. 
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the 2011 football season.138  The NCAA stated that since the players 
did not know they were violating NCAA rules, the punishments 
would be delayed until the 2011 season.139 
Many people viewed the incident involving Cam Newton as indi-
cating a major loophole in NCAA rules.140  The thought was that a 
player could bypass NCAA rules by having a third-party negotiate 
and accept payment from a school.141  This is not the case.  The reason 
Cam Newton was not suspended for violating NCAA rules was be-
cause there were no findings that he had any knowledge that his fa-
ther was negotiating payments with schools in order to have his son 
play for them.142  Additionally, there were no findings that Cecil New-
ton had received any payments from any schools.  Had Cecil accepted 
payments from a school, or anyone else, in order to ensure that Cam 
would commit to a particular school, Cam would have been ruled inel-
igible, regardless of whether he knew about the negotiations and 
payments.143  Even so, there was still a great deal of outrage by many 
over the fact that there were no sanctions laid down upon either Cam 
Newton or the University of Auburn as a result of what had tran-
spired. 
The public perception of the NCAA took another hit with the 
rulings for the OSU athletes who were suspended.144  The five OSU 
players were suspended for selling items they received from bowl 
games they had played in while members of the OSU football team.145  
While it may seem unusual to punish a student for selling their own 
property, the rule serves a legitimate purpose.  The rule is in place to 
prevent athletes from selling memorabilia to agents or school boosters 
for high prices as a way to circumvent the rules for paying athletes.  
While the fact that the athletes were disciplined for selling their own 
property was criticized, the main problem people had with the NCAA 
was the timing of the punishment.146  All the players were allowed to 
                                                                                                                           
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. 
 140 See NCAA Statement on Fairness of Rules Decisions, NCAA.ORG (Dec. 29, 2010), 
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Resources/Latest+News/2010+news+storie
s/December/NCAA+statement+on+fairness+of+rules+decisions. 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id. 
 144 See Frank Deford, NCAA Football: All Dollars, No Sense, SI.COM, 
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2011/writers/frank_deford/01/06/ncaa.money/index.html (last 
updated Jan. 7, 2011); NCAA Statement on Fairness of Rules Decisions, supra note 140. 
 145 Ohio State Football Players Sanctioned, supra note 135. 
 146 See Bruce Feldman, With Buckeyes, NCAA Just Keeps Spinning, BRUCE FELDMAN 
BLOG (Dec. 29, 2010, 11:02 AM), http://insider.espn.go.com/ncf/blog?name=feldman_bruce 
&id=5966094. 
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play in the 2011 Sugar Bowl, and the suspensions were delayed until 
the start of the 2011-2012 season.147  Five of the players facing suspen-
sion were eligible for the NFL draft so they could have easily escaped 
any discipline at all by playing in the Sugar Bowl and then declaring 
for the NFL draft.148 
While the NCAA may have the public on its side when it comes 
to agents who pay athletes, it seems to have lost some public senti-
ment, rightfully or not, when it comes to how it has handled other is-
sues involving its regulation of amateur athletics.  The fact that the 
NCAA must rely on legislation as well as the NFLPA in order to help 
enforce its standards for amateur athletics makes it important for the 
NCAA to maintain a positive public image in order to gain support.   
The media’s ability to affect policymaking plays an important 
role in the NCAA’s goal of deterring unethical agents from tampering 
with student-athlete eligibility.  As far as policymaking in the United 
States, “[t]he importance of the mass media in today’s society cannot 
be overestimated.”149  “[M]edia coverage can and does influence the 
decision to charge, the decision to reach a plea bargain, and the ulti-
mate disposition.  Responsible members of the media balance journal-
istic interests with the public’s interest in a fair justice system . . . .”150  
Legislation like SPARTA and the UAAA are based on the idea that 
it is good public policy for the government to sanction agents who 
violate NCAA rules.151  The reports indicating the NCAA’s inability 
to sanction agents played a role in the state of North Carolina pursu-
ing an investigation of Gary Wichard.152  While it may be unclear 
whether the media influences the public or if the public influences the 
media, the media can affect public opinion which can, in turn, affect 
how public officials handle high profile issues.153  Given the substantial 
impact the media can have on the NCAA’s image, and the effect that 
                                                                                                                           
 147 Id. 
 148 Ohio State Coach Jim Tressel did make all the players commit to return to school be-
fore allowing the players to play in the game, and while all the players did commit, they could 
easily break the promise and enter the draft.  See Jim Tressel: Terrelle Pryor will Return, 
ESPN.COM, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/bowls10/sugar/news/story?id=5970169 (last updated 
Dec. 30, 2010). 
 149 Kristine A. Oswald, Mass Media and the Transformation of American Politics, 77 
MARQ. L. REV. 385, 385 (1994). 
 150 Janine Robben, Oregon Media and Courts: A Guideline, 69 OR. ST. B. BULL. 33, 34 
(2009). 
 151 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7801-07 (2006); UAAA, supra note 15, at 1-2. 
 152 See Attorney: NC Investigators Interview Gary Wichard, USATODAY.COM, 
http://www. 
usatoday.com/sports/college/football/acc/2010-10-05-wichard-blake-nfl-relationship_N.htm?csp= 
34sports (last updated Oct. 5, 2010). 
 153 Oswald, supra note 149, at 402. 
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media coverage can have on lawmakers, it is essential for the NCAA 
to maintain a positive public image when it comes to agents paying 
student-athletes if the NCAA wants to see a substantial change. 
B. SPARTA and the UAAA 
SPARTA and the UAAA are both relatively good pieces of leg-
islation when it comes to covering the issues of unscrupulous agents 
that the NCAA is trying to avoid.  However, they are far from perfect.  
SPARTA does not even consider the fact that the student-athlete 
might be equally to blame for the fact that he is receiving benefits.154  
Oftentimes, it is the players who seek out agents in search of early 
compensation.155  By assuming the athlete is completely innocent in 
the matter, SPARTA leaves out what may be an equally liable party 
in any potential damages suffered by a university. 
The UAAA is a much more complete piece of legislation as it in-
cludes both a registration requirement156 and allows schools a right of 
action against a student-athlete who accepted the funds.157  This is a 
key difference between the UAAA and SPARTA because it gives the 
schools a chance to fully recover any damages suffered.  While allow-
ing schools the ability to bring a suit against a former student-athlete 
may seem like an appropriate and necessary standard, it is not likely 
that schools will start suing their former students.  The UAAA 
acknowledges this as shown by the comment to section 16:   
It is assumed that educational institutions will be very reluctant 
to bring an action against a former student-athlete.  Public opin-
ion and the desire to be successful in future recruiting of athletes 
should cause educational institutions to carefully consider wheth-
er to exercise the right . . . in most situations.  There are, howev-
er, known instances of extremely egregious conduct which caused 
serious damage to educational institutions.  Subsection (a) keeps 
open the possibility of a civil action against those individuals.158 
The liability of the player is also separate from the liability of the 
agent under the UAAA, which is also important because it allows the 
school to recover damages from the agent without worrying that the 
                                                                                                                           
 154 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7801-07 (2006). 
 155 See Dohrmann, supra note 9.  According to Luchs, players would ask for money not 
only for themselves but for their teammates as well.  Id.  Additionally, players often brought up 
the idea of payments as opposed to the agents pressuring the student to take the payments.  Id.   
 156 UAAA, supra note 15, at 7 (“[A]n individual may not act as an athlete agent in this 
State without holding a certificate of registration . . . .”). 
 157 Id. at 22 (“An educational institution has a right of action against . . . a former student-
athlete for damages caused by a violation of this [Act].”). 
 158 Id. at 23.   
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agent may indemnify the student, giving the appearance that a school 
is suing its former player.159 
The main problem with SPARTA and the UAAA is that they 
are useless, unless zealously enforced.  According to an Associated 
Press report, less than half of the forty-two states who have either en-
acted the UAAA or some other form of agent regulating legislation, 
have yet to revoke a single license, and SPARTA has not been en-
forced at all.160  Both SPARTA and the UAAA were designed for 
promoting true amateur competition in college sports, but without 
enforcement, they are just empty words. 
The lack of enforcement could be tied to the changing public sen-
timent towards the legitimacy of the NCAA.  Aside from issues like 
the NCAA’s handling of the Cam Newton and Ohio State situations, 
there are those who believe that the NCAA, itself, is hypocritical be-
cause of the large television and coaching contracts allowed while not 
allowing players to be paid.  ESPN, alone, has paid over two billion 
dollars for the rights to cover the Southeastern Conference’s games161 
and another $300 million to the University of Texas as a part of the 
University of Texas television network.162   
Headlines such as these can lead many people to think that the 
NCAA institutions are seeing huge profits at the expense of the play-
ers who remain amateurs.  While the large numbers grab the head-
lines, the fact that only fourteen out of 120 Football Bowl Subdivision 
athletic programs showed a positive net revenue between 2004 and 
2009 is indicative of the unrealistic perception of the NCAA schools.163  
While public sentiment appears to be in favor of legal sanctions for 
agents who tamper with the amateur status of collegiate athletes, the 
competing notion (however incorrect it may be) that the NCAA is 
creating a huge profit for the schools likely plays a part in the lack of 
enforcement of the laws by the state and federal governments. 
These negative perceptions of the NCAA, even if not the reality, 
especially harm the NCAA when it comes to the enforcement of the 
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UAAA.  The UAAA makes it very clear in its prefatory note that one 
of the primary reasons for the drafting of the law was because the 
NCAA requested a uniform law that would help enforce the NCAA’s 
rules.164  “[T]he NCAA and several universities asked the Conference 
to undertake the drafting of a Uniform Act.  After initial reluctance . . 
. the Conference agreed to do so.”165  The fact that the drafters of the 
UAAA specifically state that the reason for drafting it was to satisfy 
the NCAA’s request makes the NCAA’s maintenance of not only the 
actual legitimacy, but the perceived legitimacy of their amateur league 
of the utmost importance if the states are expected to zealously en-
force the UAAA. 
While bad publicity towards the NCAA may have an effect on 
whether the UAAA is enforced, the old saying, “no publicity is bad 
publicity,” may ring true for the NCAA’s hope in sanctioning unscru-
pulous agents.  The NCAA’s handling of the Cam Newton scandal 
was not viewed very favorably by the media.166  However, following 
the media reports of the scandal, the state of Mississippi and the FBI 
began investigations on whether agent laws were broken.167  The in-
vestigations focus on Kenny Rogers, a former Mississippi State Uni-
versity (“MSU”) football player.168  The allegations were that Rogers 
assisted Cecil Newton in soliciting Cam’s services to MSU in exchange 
for $180,000.169  Although Rogers is not a certified agent, or acting as 
an agent in the sense that he would be negotiating a contract with a 
professional team, he still may be considered an agent under either 
SPARTA or the UAAA.170  If the investigations find he did in fact 
negotiate to have Cam Newton paid, he would likely qualify as an 
agent under either act because he negotiated for an athlete to be paid 
for playing.171  Even though the NCAA did not receive a favorable 
media depiction following the scandal, the fact that it was widely re-
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ported caused the state and federal governments to investigate the 
matter.  If this is the start of a trend, it bodes well for the NCAA since 
their standards could be enforced regardless of whether they are per-
ceived as having handled the situation appropriately or not. 
Additionally, even if enforced, the financial penalty assessed un-
der the UAAA is a maximum of $25,000,172 which may not be enough 
to deter an agent from the potential rewards of signing a top college 
athlete.  The players selected in the first round of the 2010 NFL Draft 
signed contracts ranging in value from $9 million to $78 million over 
the life of the contract.173  At the standard three percent commission, 
the agents representing those players took commissions ranging from 
$27,000 to $234,000 for negotiating those contracts.174  Even at the 
lowest end of the first round, an agent would still make $2,000 over 
the total fine if caught.175  While the financial deterrent of the legisla-
tion may not be sufficient, the fact that a criminal record would make 
an agent ineligible for certification under the NFLPA RGCA may still 
allow the UAAA to be an effective piece of legislation if it were en-
forced regularly.  However, this still depends on the UAAA being 
regularly enforced.  Regardless of how high the penalty may be, with-
out enforcement, there will never be a deterrent.  Absent zealous en-
forcement, both SPARTA and the UAAA are meaningless. 
C. NFLPA 
The NFLPA has the greatest authority and ease of prosecuting 
rogue agents, but it also has the least amount of incentive and prose-
cutors to investigate any potential claims against agents.176  Further, 
the NFLPA is the official representative of the players.177  It would 
therefore be counter-intuitive to its purpose if the NFLPA were to 
bring to light how many of its players openly accepted unauthorized 
benefits while playing in college.  Publicizing this information would 
look bad on the part of the players, and the NFLPA would not be 
looking out for the best interest of its members if it reported their un-
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ethical acts.  Moreover, although NFLPA executive director DeMau-
rice Smith claims that curbing the issue is a priority for the NFLPA,178 
the players in the league likely do not see this as an issue worth taking 
seriously as they benefit from the payment received in college and 
suffer little to no consequences as a result of violating NCAA rules.179  
According to an anonymous blog written by an NFL player, players in 
the league openly joke about having to take a pay cut when they enter 
the NFL from college and give other teammates a hard time for not 
getting more money from agents while playing in college.180  If the 
players show little interest in the situation, then the NFLPA will not 
show interest either.  The rules in the NFLPA RGCA have no effect 
unless the players want them to be enforced and as long as the players 
feel that the agents paying college players is not a bad thing, the 
NFLPA will not actively pursue the issue. 
The best way for the NFLPA to effectively combat the issue of 
agents they certify paying college players would be for the NFLPA to 
take an active role in investigating the issues and enforcing their rules.  
This is extremely unlikely to occur anytime in the near future.  The 
current NFL CBA went into effect on August 4, 2011.181  This agree-
ment was signed after a 130-day lockout by the owners of the NFL 
franchises.182  Among the key issues negotiated in the new collective 
bargaining agreement were player safety, an eighteen-game NFL sea-
son, revenue sharing, workers compensation, and players’ salaries.183  
Noticeably missing from the NFLPA’s list of issues of concern was 
how to handle agents who violate the rules and pay collegiate athletes. 
It is questionable how much the NFLPA actually cares about the 
issue, regardless of what they may state publicly.  According to former 
agent Jeff Luchs, up until 1999, the NFLPA allowed agents to recover 
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funds from a student-athlete who accepted payments but did not end 
up signing with the agent.184  Luchs claims, that after paying the play-
ers, the agents could sue a player to recover the payments if that play-
er ended up using another agent.185  While this may have been the 
case, it is extremely unlikely that a court would enforce an agent’s 
right to recover funds he paid a student-athlete, in violation of NCAA 
rules.  Courts would likely find that upholding NCAA standards is in 
the public interest and would therefore not permit an agent to recover 
his funds under either an unclean hands, illegality, or public policy 
exception to enforcing the agreement.186  While the agents may not 
have been able to recover their payments in court, the fact that the 
NFLPA permitted them to try, shows that the NFLPA does not have 
a track record of taking unethical agent issues seriously. 
The NFLPA’s handling of two publicized agent scandals also 
calls into question the organization’s commitment to harsh punish-
ments for agents who violate the NFLPA RGCA.  Following the 
scandal involving NFLPA sanctioned agent Gary Wichard, the 
NFLPA suspended Wichard for nine months.187  While this discipline 
may seem like the NFLPA is taking the issue seriously, when com-
pared to how the NFLPA sanctioned agent Teague Egan, it shows 
that the NFLPA is really not taking the issue seriously.  Egan created 
a scandal when he gave a University of Southern California (“USC”) 
football player a ride across campus in a golf cart, in violation of 
NCAA rules.188  The NFLPA revoked Egan’s agent certification as a 
result of the scandal stating Egan “is not fit to be a certified contract 
advisor.”189  Even though the NCAA determined that players linked 
to Wichard received roughly $23,500 in benefits,190 the NFLPA only 
suspended Wichard for nine months.  The only logical conclusion is 
that the NFLPA considers a ride on a golf cart to be a more serious 
violation than providing $23,500 in benefits. 
It is possible that the unequal sanctioning of the two agents is due 
to the fact that the NFPLA only found Wichard had “impermissible 
communication,” while Egan was found to have provided a benefit.191  
However, it is more likely that the sanctions had to do with the stature 
of the agent within the NFL community.  Eagan was an undergradu-
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ate student at USC, and although certified by the NFLPA, he had no 
clients.192  Wichard, on the other hand, has been an agent since 1980.193  
He has an extensive client list, which includes star players such as 
Dwight Freeney, Jason Taylor, Terrell Suggs, and Antonio Cromart-
ie.194  He has negotiated three record-breaking NFL contracts for his 
clients.195  In the 2010 NFL Draft alone, Wichard had five players that 
he represented who were drafted,196 including a first-round pick (Spill-
er)197 and three second-round picks (Clause, Mays, and Benn).198  Giv-
en Wichard’s prominent client list, it is far more likely that the 
NFLPA preferred a slap on the wrist for Wichard since revoking his 
license would leave a number of players without an agent.  The 
NFLPA may be able to justify the seemingly light discipline if it 
chooses to only accept that Wichard had improper contact with a stu-
dent-athlete. However, should the pending state investigation convict 
Wichard of a violation of the UAAA, the NFLPA would likely have 
no choice but to revoke Wichard’s license.199 
While the NFLPA has claimed to have an interest in sanctioning 
agents who violate the NFLPA RGCA, their unwillingness to also 
assess penalties to players leaves their commitment to the issue still 
unknown. 
The NFLPA is opposed to any penalty being imposed upon a 
player in the NFL for conduct relating to the receipt of benefits 
in violation of NCAA rules while the player was in college.  
However, [the NFLPA] will continue to discuss with the NCAA . 
                                                                                                                           
 192 Moura, supra note 38. 
 193 Gary Wichard Suspended 9 Months, supra note 126. 
 194 See Client List, PRO TECT MANAGEMENT, http://www.nothinbutfreaks.com/clientlist 
(last visited Mar. 7, 2011).  
 195 See News, PRO TECT MANAGEMENT, http://www.nothinbutfreaks.com/news-archives 
(last visited Mar. 7, 2011). 
 196 NFL Live: Nothin’ But Freaks (ESPN television broadcast Feb. 15, 2010), available at 
http://www.nothinbutfreaks.com/videos/214101.  These players were Jimmy Clausen, C.J. Spiller, 
Taylor Mays, Everson Griffen, and Arrelious Benn. 
 197 2010 NFL Draft Pick List and Results – Round 1, ESPN.COM, http://insider. 
espn.go.com/nfl/draft/rounds/_/year/2010 (last visited Mar. 7, 2011). 
 198 2010 NFL Draft Pick List and Results – Round 2, ESPN.com, http://insider. 
espn.go.com/nfl/draft/rounds/_/round/2/year/2010 (last visited Mar. 7, 2011). 
 199 See NFLPA RGCA, supra note 13, at 9, 17.  The NFLPA RGCA do not have any man-
datory discipline requirements.  See id. at 17.  However, if a ride on a golf cart warranted revok-
ing Egan’s license, then a criminal conviction should merit having Wichard’s license revoked as 
well. 
2011] Regulation of Sports Agents and College Football 213 
. . issues relating to the conduct of agents certified by the NFLPA 
as they interact with NCAA players.200   
This is a logical position for the NFLPA to take as it would not 
be popular or very fair to sanction individuals for actions before they 
became members of the union.  However, the NFLPA does have a 
duty to make sure that agents representing their players are ethical.201  
This puts the NFLPA in a difficult situation.  They would likely anger 
their members if they allowed players to be sanctioned for actions 
prior to membership with the NFLPA.  However, enforcing rules 
against agents may harm their members as it would make the mem-
bers’ unethical activity public.  While the NFLPA may never take the 
drastic step of allowing their members to face repercussions for uneth-
ical acts prior to membership, they do have the duty to sanction the 
unethical agents.  However, it seems that, in reality, they are unwilling 
to sanction anyone. 
IV.   POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
While there is a great deal of focus on how bad the situation has 
become, there are also several ways in which unethical agent activity 
can be eliminated. 
A. The Media’s Role 
The media may play the largest role in forcing the various agen-
cies to work together to make some kind of change to the landscape 
where unethical agents are the norm instead of the exception.  As 
more and more news outlets continue to report on the high level of 
unscrupulous activity in the NCAA, it may cause the states with agent 
regulation and the FTC to begin enforcing the laws by following up 
with investigations based on media reports.202  It may also cause states 
without legislation to consider adopting the UAAA based on the fact 
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that not having the legislation may look bad considering the amount 
of news coverage this topic has received.  Lastly, it may cause schools 
to feel more comfortable bringing civil suits against agents or former 
players. 
If more agents were found guilty in court, it would likely force 
the NFLPA to act even if the players do not really care whether or 
not the agents are giving players benefits in college.  Even if the 
NFLPA were to eliminate the prohibitions of agents soliciting clients 
through gifts203 or pursuing clients who are not yet eligible for the 
draft,204 it would likely never eliminate the requirement that all NFL 
contract advisors must “fully comply with all state and federal laws.”205  
Even if the RGCA allowed any and all contact by agents with college 
athletes, the fact that these actions would violate state or federal law 
would force the NFLPA to suspend or revoke the agent’s license, un-
less the NFLPA wanted to eliminate the requirement that their con-
tract advisors not have a criminal record.  Under this potential solu-
tion, the media’s continued reporting of the issue may trigger the 
more zealous enforcement of the laws, which in turn, would force the 
NFLPA to suspend agents, regardless if the players are not concerned 
with the issue. 
While the media has helped bring to light the major issues involv-
ing agents paying college athletes, it has also painted a picture of the 
NCAA in a negative light.  The public appeared to be on the side of 
the NCAA in the early part of the 2010-2011 football season when 
reports of unscrupulous agents were prevalent.206  However, by the 
end of the season, hot button news stories shifted from unscrupulous 
agents to unscrupulous players.  The Cam Newton and Ohio State 
stories overshadowed the agent issues by the season’s end.  Much of 
the media attention following these stories focused on how the 
NCAA handled the discipline in these scandals, as opposed to focus-
ing on the players, their family members, and the rules they broke.207 
Since the purpose of SPARTA and the UAAA is the protection 
of the NCAA’s rules as well as the schools and athletes, it is essential 
that the NCAA remains an institution that is viewed as worthy of pro-
tection.  When the Oregon State Legislature indicated its willingness 
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to curb unethical agent activity, it was at the height of the media cov-
erage of the issue.208  While a commitment from states to enforce these 
laws is a major step towards seeing an actual change in unethical 
agent activity, what appears to be a constant change in the media’s 
portrayal of the NCAA may prevent the required follow-through due 
to a lack of public support. 
B. Minor League Football 
The NFL is the only professional sports league in the U.S. in 
which players have no option other than college where they can show-
case their skills for a potential spot on a professional roster.  Major 
League Baseball (“MLB”), the National Basketball Association 
(“NBA”) and the National Hockey League each have expansive mi-
nor leagues where players can be compensated for playing and have 
the opportunity to audition for the top-level teams.209  Aside from the 
NBA’s minor league, players hoping for a career in the NBA, as wit-
nessed by the success of players like Brandon Jennings, have the op-
tion of playing in the professional leagues in Europe before entering 
the NBA draft.210  The NBA also only requires players to wait one 
year after graduating high school before entering the NBA, and there 
is a distinct possibility that this rule will be short lived as the players 
are fighting to eliminate the rule completely.211   
While these sports are by no means clean of unscrupulous agents 
paying players, there is not a consistent barrage of news relating to 
agents paying college hockey, baseball, and basketball players (bas-
ketball receives the most attention, but it does not compare to the 
level of football).  A potential reason for this is the fact that players 
who wish to get paid immediately have some legitimate option in 
which they can showcase their talents to professional teams while re-
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ceiving some compensation for their work.212  A legitimate minor 
league football league under the NFL would give players who wish to 
be paid an option other than college football in which to impress NFL 
teams and allow the true student-athletes to compete as amateurs at 
the college level.  This plan would likely take time given the populari-
ty and exposure that an athlete can receive while playing in college.  
However, if players were successful in the NFL after spending time 
playing minor league football, it would likely serve as a viable alterna-
tive to the athlete who wishes to be paid immediately after leaving 
high school. 
The NFL should follow the lead of the MLB.  No matter how 
high profile a player is, or whether the player is entering a profession-
al career directly from high school or after a career in college athlet-
ics, there never seems to be any controversy of agents paying baseball 
players in exchange for the player signing on to be represented by the 
agent.  While it is possible this is due to the fact that college football is 
far more popular than college baseball,213 it is more likely the result of 
the growth of Minor League Baseball. 
Minor League Baseball is an affiliate of MLB.214  It consists of 
nineteen leagues ranging in classification from rookie (lowest level) to 
Triple-A (highest level).215  Each team associated with the various Mi-
nor League Baseball leagues is affiliated with an MLB team.216  The 
affiliation with a MLB team makes the choice to play in the Minor 
Leagues a viable alternative to college baseball for players who would 
like to receive compensation for playing as well as showcase their tal-
ents to MLB teams.  The fact that Minor League teams are affiliated 
with MLB teams also benefits MLB as they can directly monitor and 
train the athletes who will one day play for them as opposed to relying 
on the training from college coaches who may differ in philosophy 
from them. 
The success of Minor League Baseball217 indicates that a success-
ful minor league football system is not unrealistic.  The NFL could 
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even implement a minor league system without eliminating its re-
quirement that all NFL players be three years removed from high 
school.  The league could allow players to go directly from high school 
to the minor leagues but still force them to wait three years before 
becoming eligible for an NFL roster. 
The primary selling point to those players who have no interest in 
competing at the amateur level would be that the minor league teams 
would be affiliated with NFL clubs.218  This would allow those players 
who only wish to play professional football to have the chance to 
prove themselves directly to an NFL franchise and potentially weed 
out all the players from college football who would be susceptible to 
unscrupulous agents.  While there would be potential benefits to the 
NFL and to players who wish be paid immediately, unfortunately, 
there is no real incentive for the NFL to invest in a minor league sys-
tem.  They essentially have a risk-free minor league in the NCAA, 
and it is unlikely the NFL would risk a failed minor league if they do 
not need to. 
While a large-scale minor league system is not likely to take 
shape anytime in the near future, if the NCAA and the NFL have as-
pirations of maintaining true amateur football, then they should wel-
come the idea.  NFL franchises would have the ability to train and 
scout players before committing them to NFL rosters, and the NCAA 
would likely rid itself of the players most likely to tarnish its image of 
a true amateur athletics association. 
C. NFLPA General Counsel for Contract Negotiation 
Although realistically, this is most unlikely to occur, the most ef-
fective way to cure the problem of agents paying college players 
would be to eliminate the competition for players.  Much like the 
NFLPA hires a general counsel for all legal issues,219 the NFLPA 
could hire a team of contract advisors to assist players in contract ne-
gotiations with teams.  Agents would be paid a salary and would 
therefore eliminate the competition to represent the most high-profile 
athletes.  This system could immediately eliminate the need for agents 
to pay college athletes as the agents would be NFLPA employees and 
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would not have to compete for the highest commission as they would 
be paid salary. 
The only incentive that an agent has in paying a collegiate athlete 
is the potential that the payments will lead to the player allowing the 
agent to represent the player in contract negotiations.  With thirty-two 
current NFL teams allowed to have up to a fifty-three man roster, the 
maximum number of NFL players at any given time is only 1696.220  
With such a limited number of potential clients there is clearly a great 
deal of competition for the valuable commodity of negotiating a play-
er’s next contract.  Additionally, each year there are roughly 224 col-
legiate athletes drafted by NFL teams.221  For a person trying to be-
come an agent, this indicates the maximum number of potential cli-
ents who are guaranteed to not already have representation.  With 
such a small pool of potential clients and the lack of enforcement of 
regulations, it is no wonder that agents bend the rules by paying play-
ers.  The hope is that these illegal payments may give them the edge 
when it comes time to sign the players as new clients.  Eliminating this 
extremely competitive aspect of the agent’s business would eliminate 
agent’s incentive to pay players. 
While this solution would produce the most immediate results, it 
is by far the least likely to occur.  The players would likely not be in 
favor of this solution as they would probably much rather have an 
agent motivated by higher commission representing them in negotia-
tions with teams over their salaries.  Even if the NFLPA-governed 
agents were held to the strictest of fiduciary duties, it is still unlikely 
that the players would prefer this method over the current system of 
agents receiving a three-percent commission on contract negotiations.  
While this solution would be the most effective, it is unlikely to ever 
take shape as the players would likely not be in favor of this proposal 
at all. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
While at the moment, agents appear free to violate NCAA rules, 
the federal law in SPARTA, the state laws for the states that have 
enacted the UAAA and the NFLPA RGCA without fear of repercus-
sion, there may be hope for the future.  The NCAA faces the obsta-
cles of continuing to maintain itself as a true amateur league while 
also battling the often-unfair negative perception that it is hypocritical 
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in calling itself an amateur league.  Even with the negative perception 
that the NCAA sometimes receives, it still seems to maintain public 
support when it comes to enforcing rules against agents paying college 
athletes. 
Public support is likely the key to ensuring the enforcement of 
the NCAA rules on amateur athletics.  Whether this comes in the 
form of actual enforcement of laws, the NFLPA hoping to curb nega-
tive publicity by stripping unscrupulous agents of their licenses, or 
some new policy such as an NFLPA take-over of contract negotia-
tions or minor league football, it seems that public support of the 
NCAA is the key to ensuring that the NCAA’s standards are en-
forced. 
While an immediate change in the landscape of the NCAA is un-
likely, the fact that there are now state and federal laws to make 
agents who pay college athletes not only unethical but criminal, and 
heavy media coverage of the issue shows that change is likely.  En-
forcement of the laws will force not only the NFLPA, but also other 
leagues with unethical agents to suspend or revoke those agents’ li-
censes and hopefully allow for amateur athletics without the cloud of 
under-the-table payments from agents. 
 
